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Improved incentives for private charitable 
giving would strengthen nonprofit orga-
nizations in Puerto Rico. Because of the 
public benefits provided by a strong and 
vibrant nonprofit sector, policymakers are 
interested in identifying ways to increase 
the private financial support received by 
these organizations. This study investi-
gates options for reforming current tax 
incentives in Puerto Rico to stimulate 
additional charitable giving. We summa-
rize current laws and charitable giving in 
Puerto Rico, review studies by economists 
on how tax incentives affect giving, and 
present and estimate the effects of alterna-
tive ways to structure the deduction. 
We estimate that lifting the current 15 
percent ceiling on contributions would 
increase contributions by more than the 
revenue loss to the Puerto Rican Treasury 
and would, therefore, be a more cost-
effective way to pay for additional services 
of charitable organizations than increas-
ing direct government grants. Reforms 
that instead modify or eliminate current 
floors on contributions would add less to 
contributions than the revenue loss. Such 
changes would, however, make it easier 
for taxpayers to understand and claim the 
deduction. By increasing the number of 
taxpayers who would take advantage of 
the incentive, simplification could increase 
charitable giving by more than our esti-
mates, which consider only the effect of the 
improved financial incentive.
Current Law and Charitable 
Deductions in Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico allows a full charitable deduc-
tion only for donations by itemizers in ex-
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cess of 3 percent of adjusted gross income 
(AGI), up to a limit of 15 percent of AGI. 
As an alternative, itemizers may elect to 
deduct 33 percent of contributions. Itemiz-
ers in Puerto Rico are much less likely than 
those in the United States to claim charita-
ble deductions, but among those who give, 
average giving is higher as a share of AGI 
in Puerto Rico than in the United States. 
Rationale for a Charitable Deduction
Supporters of tax incentives to encourage 
private giving point to several benefits 
from a large and vibrant nonprofit sector. 
Many nonprofits provide goods and ser-
vices that would otherwise be provided by 
the public sector, or complement publicly 
provided goods and services in areas such 
as health care, education, family sup-
port, and support for culture and the arts. 
Nongovernment organizations that must 
compete directly for donations from indi-
viduals may be more efficient and respon-
sive than organizations that rely wholly on 
public funds and provide a different mix 
of services than publicly funded organiza-
tions, reflecting the preferences of donors. 
The government can encourage nonprofit 
organizations with tax incentives or by 
providing subsidies directly to selected 
recipients. The concept of treasury efficiency 
measures the relative cost-effectiveness 
of funding nonprofits indirectly through 
tax incentives instead of by direct grants. 
Treasury efficiency is measured as the ratio 
of additional donations in response to a tax 
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incentive to the revenue loss to the govern-
ment. If this ratio is greater than 1, it costs 
the government less per dollar transferred 
to nonprofits to provide a tax incentive 
than to give the nonprofit organizations 
direct grants.
How Charitable Tax Incentives Work
Tax incentives work by reducing the cost 
to taxpayers of making donations to eli-
gible charitable organizations. To illustrate, 
suppose that a taxpayer is considering 
donating $100 to a charity, but there is no 
financial incentive to do so. In that case, 
the cost of the $100 charitable gift is $100. 
Now suppose that this taxpayer is in the 
33 percent bracket and is allowed to take a 
full income tax deduction for the $100 gift. 
If she gives $100 to charity, she is able to re-
duce her taxable income by the amount of 
the gift ($100), resulting in a tax saving to 
her of $33. The net effect is that the actual 
cost of giving $100 is $67. If one assumes 
that the taxpayer gets satisfaction from 
transferring money to a charity just as she 
gets satisfaction from buying consump-
tion goods for her own use, the drop in the 
price of transferring a dollar to a charity to 
67 cents should increase the amount she 
chooses to give to charities. 
The fiscal effects of a financial incen-
tive for charitable giving depend on how 
responsive people are to a price discount 
for giving. Consider the example above, in 
which the person is willing to give $100 to 
charity without any financial incentive but 
is now allowed a deduction for the $100 
gift at a 33 percent tax rate. If the deduc-
tion leaves the person’s giving unchanged 
at $100, the government would effectively 
pick up $33 of the $100 gift (through the 
tax deduction), and the person’s cost of 
giving (or “spending” on gifts) would be 
$67. But the deductions leave the amount 
charity would receive unchanged at $100. 
In this example, the tax deduction raises 
the giver’s after-tax income available for 
other uses (consumption of other goods or 
saving) but leaves charitable contributions 
unchanged. Suppose, instead, that the 33 
percent drop in the cost of giving causes 
the taxpayer to increase her gift to $120. 
The cost to the treasury in terms of forgone 
tax revenue would be just under $40 (e.g., 
0.33 X $120, or $39.60), while the gift would 
increase by $20. The taxpayer would 
spend $20 of her almost $40 tax benefit 
on increasing giving and would have the 
remainder left over for other uses. Finally, 
suppose the taxpayer increased her giving 
to $160. The cost to the treasury would be 
$52.80 (0.33 X $160), which is less than the 
increase in giving. The taxpayer would be 
increasing her giving by more than her tax 
benefit, causing her to “spend” more on 
giving to charities and less on other uses. 
Charitable Giving in Puerto Rico
Incentives. Taxpayers will choose to claim a 
charitable deduction equal to either 33 per-
cent of all giving or 100 percent of giving 
in excess of 3 percent of AGI, depending on 
how much they are giving. Taxpayers who 
give less than 4.5 percent of AGI are better 
off deducting 33 percent of all contribu-
tions. For example, if a taxpayer with AGI 
of $70,000 gives 4 percent of AGI ($2,800), 
she may take a deduction of $924 (33 
percent of $2,800). If instead she chose to 
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deduct 100 percent of contributions above 
3 percent of AGI ($2,100), she could deduct 
only $700. In contrast, taxpayers who give 
more than 4.5 percent of AGI gain more 
by deducting 100 percent of contributions 
above 3 percent (table 1).
The price of giving an additional dollar 
varies according to the taxpayer’s marginal 
tax bracket and how much he or she gives. 
For taxpayers who give less than 4.5 per-
cent of AGI, the deduction is worth only 33 
percent of their marginal tax rate. For ex-
ample, a taxpayer in the 33 percent bracket 
gets a tax saving of 11 cents, which means 
that it costs her 89 cents to give a dollar 
to charity. For a taxpayer in the lowest 
bracket (7 percent), the net price of giving a 
dollar is 98 cents, almost no incentive at all. 
In contrast, for those in the top tax bracket 
who give more than 4.5 percent of AGI, the 
net price of giving a dollar is 67 cents. 
Table 1. Structure of the Puerto Rican Charitable Tax Incentive
Contributions 
as 
percentage 
of AGI
Amount of 
contribution 
(AGI = 
$70,000)
3% of 
AGI
Tax 
deduction 
= 33% of 
contributions
Tax deduction 
= 100% of 
contributions 
> 3%  of AGI
Most 
favorable 
option
Value of tax deduction 
(next $1 of giving)
Tax Bracket
7% 10% 15% 28% 33%
1.0% $700 $2,100 $231 $0 33% of 
contributions
$0.02 $0.03 $0.05 $0.09 $0.11
1.5% $1,050 $2,100 $347 $0 33% of 
contributions
$0.02 $0.03 $0.05 $0.09 $0.11
2.5% $1,750 $2,100 $578 $0 33% of 
contributions
$0.02 $0.03 $0.05 $0.09 $0.11
3.0% $2,100 $2,100 $693 $0 33% of 
contributions
$0.02 $0.03 $0.05 $0.09 $0.11
3.5% $2,450 $2,100 $809 $350 33% of 
contributions
$0.02 $0.03 $0.05 $0.09 $0.11
4.0% $2,800 $2,100 $924 $700 33% of 
contributions
$0.02 $0.03 $0.05 $0.09 $0.11
4.5% $3,150 $2,100 $1,050 $1,050 33% of all 
contributions 
or 100% of 
contributions 
> 3% of AGI
$0.07 $0.10 $0.15 $0.28 $0.33
4.6% $3,220 $2,100 $1,063 $1,120 100% of 
contributions 
> 3% of AGI
$0.07 $0.10 $0.15 $0.28 $0.33
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The charitable deduction is capped at 15 
percent of AGI. This means that Puerto 
Rican taxpayers who donate more than 15 
percent of AGI receive no incentive (price 
subsidy) for giving more. They do receive 
a deduction for charitable contributions 
equal to the difference between the capped 
amount of 15 percent of AGI and the floor 
amount of 3 percent of AGI (an amount 
equal to 15 percent minus 3 percent or 12 
percent of AGI). In our example, this is 
worth 3.96 percent of AGI to a taxpayer in 
the 33 percent bracket. This “lump sum” 
tax cut raises the person’s after-tax income 
and may enable him or her to give more, 
but it does not reduce the price of giving.1 
Performance. Partly as a result of these 
constrained incentives, the proportion of 
taxpayers who claim charitable deductions 
in Puerto Rico is small compared with the 
United States, although the average deduc-
tion for those who contribute is larger. In a 
recent year, fewer than 1 in 10 Puerto Rican 
taxpayers who itemized claimed deduc-
tions for charitable contributions, com-
pared with almost 9 of 10 itemizing U.S. 
federal taxpayers. The average amount 
claimed by Puerto Rican contributors to 
charity ($4,500) is, however, slightly higher 
than the average amount claimed by U.S. 
contributors ($4,200), and is a much higher 
share of overall AGI.2 
These figures may reflect the incentives 
in Puerto Rico, which are very limited for 
small contributors but more generous for 
large (though not very large) donors. It is 
also possible that contributors may time 
or bunch their contributions from year to 
year in response to the contribution floor 
to maximize their deductions. Representa-
tives of stakeholder groups in Puerto Rico 
also cite social and cultural factors, includ-
ing a tendency for people to be very gen-
erous in response to emergency appeals 
but less likely to give on an ongoing basis 
to established nonprofit organizations. 
(However, a number of stakeholders who 
were interviewed for this project noted that 
Puerto Ricans give regularly to churches.)
Estimates of the Effects of 
Charitable Deductions
Numerous studies, mostly in the United 
States, have attempted to estimate the re-
sponsiveness of charitable contributions to 
tax incentives. The key variable used is the 
price elasticity of contributions; that is, the 
percentage change in giving in response 
to a given percentage change in the price. 
If, for example, a 10 percent reduction in 
the price of giving increases giving by 15 
percent, the price elasticity is equal to –1.5; 
if it only increases giving by 5 percent, the 
price elasticity is –0.5. The value of the 
price elasticity determines whether the 
subsidy is said to be treasury efficient in 
the sense that additional giving induced 
by the incentive exceeds the revenue loss 
to the treasury. While virtually all research 
finds a significant response to the price of 
giving, the results vary regarding whether 
the subsidy is treasury efficient.
Studies have used a variety of data sources 
(including administrative and survey data) 
and methods (including multiple regres-
sion analysis and experiments on subjects). 
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Peloza and Steel (2005) summarized the 
results of studies applying regression 
analysis to administrative and survey data. 
The studies examine the statistical relation-
ship between amounts contributed and a 
set of explanatory variables, including a 
taxpayer’s income and the cost of giving 
(which is 1 minus the marginal tax rate if 
an additional dollar contributed is deduct-
ible). The studies examine variations in 
giving among individual taxpayers and 
over time. The more sophisticated stud-
ies make use of panel datasets—data that 
examine the behavior of the same group of 
taxpayers over time. This approach enables 
researchers to separate out permanent ef-
fects of incentives from transitory effects of 
temporarily lower tax rates on the timing 
of contributions.
The studies that Peloza and Steel summa-
rize reach three main conclusions:
Contributions are affected by the price 1. 
of giving; people contribute more (less) 
when the price of contributing is lower 
(higher).
On average, price elasticity estimates 2. 
from survey data are larger than esti-
mates from administrative data.
On average, the price elasticity esti-3. 
mates are greater than 1, suggesting 
that charitable incentives can be trea-
sury efficient (i.e., can increase chari-
table contributions by as much as or 
more than they cost the treasury). How-
ever, 40 percent of the studies reviewed 
found an absolute value less than 1.3 
In recent years, researchers have also 
estimated the responsiveness of giving to 
incentives using laboratory experiments in 
which subjects are divided into treatment 
and control groups with different incen-
tives to give to charities. Compared with 
earlier studies, these experiments usually 
find lower price responses. Preliminary 
findings also suggest that the structure of 
the incentive matters—people are much 
more responsive to government or private 
grants that explicitly match a fraction of 
the amount given than to tax rebates with 
the same net effect on the price of giving.4 
Recent research also has found that sensi-
tivity to changes in the cost of giving in-
creases with income. Thus, in our analyses 
of reform options below, we assume that 
Puerto Rican taxpayers whose AGI places 
them in the top 10th of those who item-
ize have a price elasticity of giving of –1.2, 
while the remaining 9/10ths of itemizers 
have a price elasticity of –0.80. In other 
words, our simulations assume that a 10 
percent cut in the cost of giving would in-
crease contributions by 12 percent among 
high-income itemizers and by 8 percent 
among other itemizers. We also assume 
that the income sensitivity of giving (its 
income elasticity) is positive and that a 10 
percent increase in the taxpayer’s after-tax 
income (through, for example, a deduction 
that for inframarginal contributions does 
not reduce taxes for contributions beyond 
what the taxpayer would have given 
anyway) would increase contributions by 
7 percent. We use these estimates as repre-
sentative findings from previous research, 
although a wide range of uncertainly exists 
regarding the size of these responses.
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Options for Reform
We assess the effect of the current Puerto 
Rican charitable deduction and analyze 
four options for reform: 
Raise the 15 percent ceiling on chari-1. 
table contributions to 50 percent.
Allow a full deduction for all contri-2. 
butions in excess of 1 percent of AGI, 
while eliminating the 33 percent partial 
deduction for contributions less than 
the 1 percent floor.
Combine options (1) and (2); that is, 3. 
reduce the floor, eliminate the partial 
deduction, and increase the ceiling.
Allow a full deduction for all contribu-4. 
tions up to a ceiling of 50 percent of 
AGI (U.S. law).
Incentive Effects
Changes in the tax treatment of charitable 
contributions can affect individual tax-
payers in two distinct ways: (1) through 
changes in the price of giving, and (2) 
through changes in the income of the giver 
(Feldstein and Lindsey, 1983). Changes 
in the price of giving occur when policy 
changes lower or raise the out-of-pocket 
cost of giving an additional dollar. For 
example, changing Puerto Rican tax law 
to allow a taxpayer in the 33 percent tax 
bracket who previously had deducted one-
third of contributions to deduct 100 per-
cent of contributions would lower the price 
of giving an additional dollar from 89 cents 
to 67 cents. To simulate the effect on giving 
of such a change, we first compute the per-
centage change in the cost of giving (–24.7 
percent), then multiply this amount by 
the price elasticity of giving (–1.2), which 
yields an estimate that the lower cost of 
giving would increase contributions by 
29.6 percent (24.7 X 1.2). This percentage is 
then applied to the total amount of giving 
to estimate the increased giving we would 
expect to result from a drop in its cost. 
Other changes in current law would either 
eliminate or modify floors and ceilings. 
Such changes affect not only the price of 
giving, but also the taxpayer’s after-tax 
income. For example, the effect of allow-
ing taxpayers to deduct 100 percent of 
contributions in excess of 3 percent of AGI 
is financially equivalent to an incentive 
that (a) reduces the cost of giving a dol-
lar for all contributions but then (b) claws 
back deductions up to (tax increase to the 
treasury) the first 3 percent of AGI. We 
treat the lump-sum claw-back as a reduc-
tion in after-tax income and estimate the 
impact this would have on giving in two 
steps. First, we estimate the percentage 
change (reduction) in the taxpayer’s after-
tax income owing to the claw-back, then 
we multiply this percentage by the income 
elasticity of giving. 
The options we consider would have the 
following incentive effects:
Current Puerto Rican law •	 relative to the 
absence of a deduction reduces the 
price of giving by only (1–(1/3 X MTR)) 
for taxpayers who contribute less than 
4.5 percent of AGI (where MTR is the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, or tax 
bracket). For taxpayers who give more 
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than 4.5 percent of AGI, it reduces the 
price of giving to (1–MTR), but the 3 
percent floor imposes a lump sum tax 
equal to (MTR X 0.03 X AGI). For tax-
payers who give more than 15 percent 
of AGI, the price of giving remains at 
$1 (no price subsidy), but these tax-
payers receive a lump sum subsidy 
equal to (0.12 X MTR X AGI), where 
(0.12 X AGI) is the difference between 
the floor (0.03 X AGI) and the ceiling 
(0.15 X AGI).
Lifting the 15 percent cap •	 converts the 
lump sum subsidy to a price subsidy, 
combined with a lump sum tax equal to 
(MTR X 0.03 X AGI) for taxpayers who 
give more than 15 percent of AGI. This 
substantially increases their contribu-
tions, while the government loses ad-
ditional revenue only on the additional 
contributions above 15 percent of AGI.
Reducing the floor to 1 percent and elimi-•	
nating the one-third deduction reduces 
the price of giving to (1–MTR) from 
(1–1/3 X MTR) for taxpayers who cur-
rently give between 1 and 4.5 percent 
of AGI, providing these relatively small 
givers with bigger incentives to con-
tribute more. However, these taxpayers 
will face a small lump sum tax from the 
new floor they are subject to (MTR X 
0.01 X AGI). For taxpayers who cur-
Simulating the Effect on Giving of a Contribution Floor
Consider a taxpayer with $100,000 of pretax income and $80,000 of after-tax income 
who is in the 33 percent bracket and who would give $5,000 with no tax deduction. 
Under current Puerto Rican law, her contribution of $5,000 is more than 4.5 percent 
of AGI, so she gets a tax deduction equal to $2,000 ($5,000 minus the $3,000 floor), 
which is worth $660 at a 33 percent tax rate. 
The charitable deduction affects her giving in two ways. First, the deduction 
reduces the cost of giving from a dollar to 67 cents, which reduces the cost of 
giving an additional dollar by 33 percent. Applying the price elasticity of –1.2 to 
the decline in price of 33 percent increases her contributions by $1,980 (0.33 X 1.2 X 
$5,000). But because of the 3 percent contribution floor, she also faces a lump sum 
tax from the loss of deductions on the first $3,000 of contributions. This tax equals 
$990 (0.33 X 0.03 X $100,000) and reduces her after-tax income by 1.24 percent 
($990/$80,000). These changes are economically equivalent to changing the income 
of the taxpayer. Thus, applying the income elasticity of 0.7, the drop in after-tax 
income reduces her contributions by $43 (0.0124 X 0.7 X $5,000). On balance, the 
charitable deduction raises her contribution by $1,937 to $6,937 ($1,980 minus $43). 
The giver’s total deduction in this example would be $3,937, and the revenue cost 
to the treasury would be $1,299.
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rently give between 4.5 and 15 percent 
of AGI, lowering the floor from 3 to 1 
percent reduces the lump sum tax by 
(MTR X 0.02 X AGI) but leaves their 
price of giving unchanged. For taxpay-
ers who give less than 1 percent of AGI, 
this option raises the price of giving 
slightly by eliminating the small price 
subsidy they currently receive (1/3 X 
MTR). Finally, reducing the floor to 1 
percent provides a small lump sum 
benefit (MTR X 0.02 X AGI) to taxpay-
ers who now contribute more than 15 
percent of AGI. 
Allowing a full deduction up to a ceiling •	
of 50 percent of AGI (U.S. law) converts 
the deduction into a pure price subsidy 
with no lump sum taxes or subsidies 
for anyone giving less than 50 percent 
of AGI. Compared with current Puerto 
Rican law, it reduces the price of giv-
ing for those who contribute less than 
4.5 percent of AGI or between 15 and 
50 percent of AGI, eliminates the lump 
sum tax on those who give between 
4.5 and 15 percent of AGI, and elimi-
nates the lump sum subsidy for those 
who give between 15 and 50 percent of 
AGI. Compared with current law, this 
increases the incentive to give for all 
taxpayers, with the largest increased in-
centive for those who currently contrib-
ute less than 4.5 percent or more than 
15 percent of AGI. 
Estimated Effects on Charitable Giving 
and Tax Revenue
We simulated the effects of these options 
on charitable giving and revenue to the 
Puerto Rican Treasury using a spreadsheet 
model of taxpayers grouped by AGI. Ide-
ally, we would use taxpayer data at the 
micro or individual level, which would 
reflect the diversity of taxpayer behavior 
within income groups; however, because 
the available data are aggregated by in-
come group, we treat each AGI group as a 
single representative taxpayer and examine 
how that representative taxpayer would 
respond to the different charitable giving 
provisions. Where we need additional data 
on within-group distributions of taxpayer 
behavior (such as the distribution within 
each AGI group of taxpayers with different 
contributions as a percentage of AGI), we 
impute data to the Puerto Rican spread-
sheet model from the Urban-Brookings Tax 
Policy Center microsimulation model for 
U.S. individual income tax returns (Rohaly, 
Carasso, and Saleem 2005).
The simulations are based on contribution 
data aggregated by income class for 2007 
and provided to us by Hacienda. Thus, the 
results are best interpreted as an attempt 
to gauge the effect of different policies had 
they been in effect in 2007. Because of the 
subsequent economic recession, baseline 
contributions under current law could be 
lower in both the present and the future.
We estimate that the current Puerto Ri-
can deduction increases contributions by 
approximately $15 million (relative to the 
2007 baseline) at a roughly equal cost to 
Hacienda of $15.2 million. Raising the ceil-
ing on deductions would cost an addition-
al $5.3 million but would raise contribu-
tions by $7.0 million—an increase of over 
$1.30 in giving for each dollar of revenue 
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sacrificed. Raising the ceiling is relatively 
efficient, because it provides an incentive 
for very large donors to give more, while 
current law gives large donors a significant 
rebate for gifts up to 15 percent of AGI 
but no incentive to give more. In contrast, 
lowering the floor to 1 percent and retain-
ing the 15 percent ceiling costs more ($6.4 
million) than the increase in giving ($5.3 
million), because it provides rebates for 
contributions between 1 and 3 percent of 
AGI by people who are already giving 
more than the 3 percent floor.
Among the options, shifting to a U.S.-style 
unlimited deduction has the largest impact 
on contributions ($13.4 million of addi-
tional giving) but also the largest revenue 
cost ($12.1 million). It would improve the 
efficiency of the subsidy, but efficiency dif-
ferences among the options are not large 
and the revenue loss would increase. Still, 
Puerto Rico might want to fund a mod-
erate expansion of its charitable sector. 
Moreover, simplifying the calculation of 
deductions, removing the floors and partial 
deduction, and raising the ceiling might 
induce more participation and thereby 
provide even larger net benefits than these 
calculations suggest. 
In addition to changing the incentive 
structure of the deduction, the government 
might make other changes in the charitable 
provisions. Many stakeholders in Puerto 
Rico expressed the view that it would 
be desirable to link any expansion of the 
deduction to measures to improve the 
Table 2. Effects of Options—Summary
Options 
Charitable Giving
$(Millions)
Revenue Cost
$(Millions)
No Deduction 88.3 --
Current Puerto Rican law 103.4 -15.2
Change in Giving and Revenue Compared with No Deduction + 5.1 15.2
Lift the Deduction Ceiling 110.4 -20.5
Change in Giving and Revenue Compared with Current Law +7.0 5.3
Deduction for 100 percent of contributions > 1 percent of AGI up 
to 15 percent of AGI 108.7 -21.6
Change in Giving and Revenue Compared with Current Law +5.3 -6.4
Deduction of 100 percent of contributions in excess of 1 
percent of AGI 115.8 -25.8
Change in Giving and Revenue Compared with Current Law +12.3 -10.6
Adopt a U.S.-Style Charitable Contribution 116.8 -27.3
Change in Giving and Revenue Compared with Current Law +$13.4 -12.1
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accountability of nonprofit organizations 
in Puerto Rico. One option is to require 
organizations to register with the IRS as 
501(c)(3) organizations as a condition of re-
ceiving either any deductible contributions 
or the enhanced deductions advanced in 
these options. This could be an important 
first step toward greater transparency 
and accountability, and could help ensure 
that the revenue lost as a result of enact-
ing these options would go to pay for the 
activities the subsidy intends to promote.
Conclusions 
Nonprofit organizations provide public 
benefits to society and have some advan-
tages over government agencies when it 
comes to supplying these services. Puerto 
Rico is seeking to strengthen the nonprofit 
sector while at the same time restraining 
budgetary costs. Tax incentives for private 
giving may be an efficient way to stimulate 
nonprofit activity, which can help relieve 
some of the public sector burden of provid-
ing social services.5
On the basis of our assessment of the eco-
nomic literature on how people respond 
to incentives for giving, we estimate that 
lifting the ceiling on contributions could 
increase contributions by more than the 
revenue loss to the Puerto Rican Treasury 
and, therefore, would be a cost-effective 
way to pay for additional services from 
these organizations, compared with direct 
grants. Reforms that modify or eliminate 
floors on contributions would add less 
to giving than the revenue loss, but they 
would simplify tax filing and could in-
crease the very low current participation 
in charitable giving in Puerto Rico by more 
than our estimates suggest. Any expan-
sion of the charitable deduction, however, 
should be accompanied by measures to 
improve the accountability of nonprofit 
organizations in Puerto Rico.
Notes
Given the current high rate of unem-1. 
ployment in Puerto Rico (15.6 percent 
in October 2009), a secondary effect of 
providing enhanced charitable deduc-
tions would be to provide a tax cut. If 
such a tax cut were not offset by other 
tax increases or public spending cuts, 
it would raise total spending in the 
economy. This higher spending could 
produce multiplier effects when sellers 
re-spend their increased incomes on 
goods and services in the Puerto Rican 
economy, further raising Puerto Rican 
employment and incomes by amounts 
comparable to those of income tax cuts 
of a similar magnitude.
In both the United States and Puerto 2. 
Rico, only itemizers may claim chari-
table deductions on their individual 
income tax returns.
These studies are described in more 3. 
detail in Boris et al. (2009).
A 25 percent matching grant is equiva-4. 
lent to a 20 percent deduction; in each 
case, every $80 spent by the taxpayer 
transfers $100 to the charity. But re-
search shows that people are more 
responsive if they are told that their $80 
contribution will be supplemented with 
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a 25 percent ($20) matching contribu-
tion than if they are given a $20 rebate 
for every $100 they contribute. 
Some recent research, for example, 5. 
finds evidence that nonprofit organiza-
tions may relieve individual states of 
some of the fiscal costs of providing 
services. See Carroll (2008).
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